It
wasn't explicitly tasked by Congress with assessing the safety
culture of nuclear facilities.

Nevertheless,
an extensive new
report written by the Committee on Lessons Learned from the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S.
Nuclear Plants devoted an entire chapter to the issue.

The
report, published by the National Academies Press, recommends that
regulators such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission guard against
erosion of their independence from outside influences, that
regulators and industry continually monitor safety culture, and that
both increase their transparent communication with the public about
efforts to assess and improve safety culture.

“The
committee quickly came to understand that the lack of a strong
nuclear safety culture was an important contributing factor to the
Fukushima Daiichi accident,” the authors write in the chapter's
introduction. “The committee also came to appreciate the important
role that nuclear safety culture plays in nuclear plant operations
and regulations in the United States.”

The
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility was heavily damaged on March 11,
2011 by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. The
shore-hugging plant flooded and lost power. Three reactors suffered
severe core damage. Hydrogen explosions occurred in three reactor
buildings. The hobbled plant leaked radiation, stoking fears in Japan
and abroad. Since then, efforts have been underway to
clean the site and dismantle the plant.

Unit 4 of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on Dec. 18, 2012.
The remains of the building’s upper levels, which were destroyed by
a hydrogen explosion, were removed to allow for construction of a
cover so that fuel stored in the unit’s spent fuel pool could be
moved to a common pool. Photo by Gill Tudor / IAEA. Some rights
reserved.

The
report notes that both Japan and the U.S. have proffered statements
that would seemingly signal a commitment to a strongly
safety-oriented organizational culture, defined as a confluence of behavioral norms, shared attitudes and traditions. After the Fukushima disaster,
however, it became apparent that in Japan there was a wide gulf
between these statements and their implementation.

Both
industry and government share blame for these shortcomings. For
instance, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which operated the plant,
admitted to falsifying reports to Japanese regulators in 29 cases
between 1988 and 1998, as well as frauds in safety-related
inspections in 1993-1994.

When
improved seismic and tsunami safety standards for the facilities,
neither TEPCO nor Japan's Nuclear Safety and Industry Agency made
sustained efforts to enact them.

NISA,
say the authors, was the victim of regulatory capture – a situation
in which a regulating body becomes beholden to the entities regulated
by it. This was, to some extent, by design: NISA was subsumed under
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The report calls this
ministry “an aggressive advocate for promotion of nuclear power in
Japan and abroad.”

NISA
was rife with features of a captured agency, including a revolving
door between industry and regulatory jobs and a policy whereby plant
operators were allowed to apply regulations on a voluntary basis.

In
the wake of the Fukushima accident, NISA was reorganized as the
Nuclear Regulation
Authority and given greater independence as an extra-ministerial
part of the Environment Ministry. There are also new restrictions to
limit members of the NRA from taking jobs in METI or in the nuclear
industry.

The
authors, however, say these actions are not enough. They conclude
that the new structures are “unlikely to be effective unless they
establish and closely adhere to good safety culture practices.”

Compared
with Japan, the report offers some good news about the state of
nuclear safety culture in the U.S. Both the NRC and the Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations, a non-profit industry consortium,
have detailed safety culture policy statements.

“The
INPO principles show that implementation of the nuclear safety
culture is an organizational obligation that begins at the top of the
corporate ladder and applies to every worker at nuclear plants,”
the authors explain. The INPO provides biannual evaluations of plant
operations. Operators have safety review groups that meet regularly
to review plant safety and report their findings to managers. Some
nuclear operators have even created independent review groups to
visit the plant and draw up their own reports.

There
is also work under way to establish metrics with which to measure
safety culture.

While
the report lauds these efforts, it also cautions that gaps remain.
The NRC's policy statement has no mechanism of enforcement, and the
INPO lacks the authority to enforce many of its policies.

The
committee was divided on whether the NRC may be succumbing to a level
of regulatory capture akin to Japan's. The U.S. regulator has the
advantage of being separate from nuclear research and promotion,
which falls under the Energy Research and Development Administration.
It also has formal independence from the Executive Branch (though not
from Congress).

But
some members note that the NRC committed itself in the late 1990s to
increased industry participation in regulatory activities. This led
to the establishment of some voluntary programs instead of direct
regulation. Participation in the voluntary programs varies, leaving
no assurance of consistency. A post-Fukushima examination by the NRC
of U.S. nuclear plants' severe action management guidance, for
instance, found that facilities implemented that guidance
inconsistently.

One
incident that illustrates this faction's view is the near-accident in
2002 at the Davis-Besse
nuclear plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. Corrosion had eaten into the
reactor pressure vessel head, leaving only about three-eighths of an
inch of material holding back the reactor coolant. The NRC had
allowed the plant to operate prior to this discovery, despite strong
indications the facility was not in compliance with regulations.

Other
members of the committee, however, say the NRC took appropriate
action afterward by shutting the plant down, fining the operator, and
taking general steps to strengthen safety culture. They point out
that the incident occurred over 10 years ago, and so might not
reflect the current regulatory state.

Some
members also question whether industry participation has truly
weakened the NRC. They note that industry was intimately involved
with regulation prior to the 1990s, and that all agencies expect
involvement by stakeholders.

“The
committee does not have enough information to determine whether
industry participation in regulatory processes has increased since
the late 1990s or whether voluntary initiatives are being substituted
for regulatory actions,” the authors write.

How,
then, can one be sure words about safety culture are matched by
attitudes and deeds?

More
sunlight. The chapter conclusion says the best way to ensure a strong
safety culture is to increase communication with, and feedback from,
the general public.

“Open
and transparent communication is an important component of the
nuclear safety culture and essential to maintaining confidence in
nuclear power,” it says.