A chain saw, sporting all the safety
interlocks, might still kill you if
you use it carelessly. You’re self-confident and you suffer the usual optimism
bias. Do you buy
the chainsaw?
A driverless car (autonomous vehicle, or AV)
is programmed to kill you under
certain conditions. It’s clear, up front, that those conditions will be beyond
your control; your self-confidence is irrelevant. Will you pay for this
machine? Is the manufacturer insane to believe you would buy your own possible
execution?
The second scenario refers to the Trolley Problem – the (usually) hypothetical
dilemma in which you must choose to sacrifice your own life in a traffic
situation, or kill one or more pedestrians. Recent articles have put forward
the view that the Trolley Problem inevitably will be faced by AVs, and must be
considered in their programming.
I believe the two scenarios describe two
different psychological situations and lead to two different customer
decisions. As the question seems urgent – all signs point to AVs appearing in
the marketplace soon and inevitably – I have asked a guest blogger to add his
views to mine.
Scenario 1 is a common situation. We often
buy products that endanger us at moments when our skill and alertness – or the
skill and alertness of those around us – are not near optimum. Ordinary
automobiles are a perfect example. We pay our money, we do our best, and we
take our chances. This is how humans have acted for thousands of years.
Cigarettes present a situation more similar,
but not identical, to AVs. Smoking-related cancer is a crap-shoot; it may
happen sooner, later, or not at all. The difference is that only tobacco
addicts take the gamble. AVs will protect or endanger everyone who drives,
rides or walks on or near a roadway.
Regular readers know I am a technological
optimist. Today though, I am declaring that AVs in their currently envisioned
form (i.e., on streets rather than on tracks) are unsuited for the market.
Readers will also notice that this management blog usually deals with
uncertainty reduction, a goal beloved by managers. I’m now highlighting a case
where we embrace uncertainty. Why
would humans embrace uncertainty? The reason that’s pertinent here is, “It’s
the only way we can indulge our optimism bias.”
A Public Broadcasting System web site lets
you self-test on the Trolley Problem and other moral choices. When someone – even PBS! – asks you the Trolley
question, they commit a fallacy by assuming only two possible courses of
action. If you, as subject, go along with the assumption, all you’re doing is
acting as the questioner’s enabler. (Who’s testing whom, really?) The best
possible reply to the trolley problem is, "I don't do hypotheticals."
There are always unique and extenuating
conditions in every real instance of risk, including traffic risk. There is
always a third choice.
This makes one ask whether a machine can
react appropriately to the unique conditions, and take that third or fourth
option. I believe they cannot. First, static programming can prepare the machine to deal only with foreseen
circumstances.
The previous sentence was just a
scene-setting straw man; there will be no static programming. The central
program governing the whole population of deployed AVs will “learn” and modify
itself as each vehicle encounters new conditions. One problem though: The
program’s creators won’t know what has been learned, except by watching the
cars’ movements. The cars’ adaptive behavior will become unpredictable, and
perhaps detrimental to human safety.
Okay, human drivers can be unpredictable and
dangerous too. But there are additional problems with the AVs.
They are, for most of their operating time,
autonomous from human control. However, they
are not autonomous from each other. AVs communicate with each other and
with a central computer program. This means the vendor’s challenge is not just
to control an individual vehicle, but to control the entire network of
vehicles.
The testing of small AV networks has gone
fairly well, with only one collision I recall hearing about.* The tests won’t
scale to the mass market, however, because the complexity of the system, and
thus the chance of system breakdown, increases super-linearly with the number
of networked vehicles.
The AV programmers may be trying to emulate
flocking behavior. Each bird in a flock, following a few simple rules (for
example, “Remain about two wing-lengths away from the bird on your left”),
creates highly coherent mass behavior. The problems with translating this to AV networks
are (i) the rules for avoiding other AVs, pedestrians, buildings, etc., have to
be more complex than for schools of fish or flocks of birds; (ii) AVs will
sometimes revert to the human driver’s control; and (iii) tests have shown the
most accident-prone moments are the instants during that changeover from
machine to human control. Some manufacturers are talking about AVs that will
not allow a human driver to take control. I don’t know whether that is more
scary or less, but I don’t think it would be practical for our transportation
needs.
Consumers can’t be sure the computer
program’s prime directive is to protect human life. Programmers may have given
the AV network a directive to smooth traffic flow, or to maximize rider
convenience. (Look at the pharmaceutical industry for examples of how things
can go wrong in terms of prime directive.) Indeed, though I have not had time to fact-check
it before writing this column, it’s my impression that articles on AVs tout
life-saving as a by-product of
autonomous vehicle deployment, not as the primary purpose.
Bonnefon et al (2015) surveyed public
attitudes about AVs programmed to solve the Trolley Problem using the
“Utilitarian” principle.
“Although [respondents] were generally unwilling to
see self-sacrifices enforced by law, they were more prepared for such legal
enforcement if it applied to AVs, than if it applied to humans. Several reasons
may underlie this effect: unlike humans, computers can be expected to
dispassionately make utilitarian calculations in an instant; computers, unlike
humans, can be expected to unerringly comply with the law, rendering moot the
thorny issue of punishing non-compliers; and finally, a law requiring people to
kill themselves would raise considerable ethical challenges.
“Even in the absence of
legal enforcement, most respondents agreed that AVs should be programmed for
utilitarian self-sacrifice, and to pursue the greater good rather than protect
their own passenger. However, they were not as confident that AVs would be
programmed that way in reality—and for a good reason: They actually wished others to cruise in utilitarian AVs, more than
they wanted to buy utilitarian AVs themselves.”
News items published after I began drafting
this column suggest AVs will be rented by endusers, not purchased. That is, the
manufacturers are targeting the taxi and Über markets. OK, but what’s really a
horse of a different color is that they are pushing for urban districts in
which human-driven vehicles will be prohibited. Seen from one angle, the logic
is clear: In a collision between an AV and an ordinary vehicle, it’s easier to
blame a machine than a human driver, so the liability issues get big. Seen from
another angle, it raises a fundamental question about our future: Are our
cities for machines, or are they for people?
In certain (admittedly, probably rare) AV
crisis situations, you’re dead, and you know this in advance. When you are driving, there is always hope.
Where there’s life, there’s hope. Where there’s machines, who knows?
Manufacturers are rushing AVs to market without due regard for the human
psychology that makes AVs unworkable.**
Now, over to my guest,
who adds still another important dimension to the argument. Joe Rabinovitsj
makes the dark implication that the easy market for AVs will be people who
don’t mind – probably because they are accustomed to it – feeling helpless.
Agency
and Autonomous Vehicles: a Hopeless Deal; a Response to Fred Phillips
There is a consideration that our
discussion of psychological hang-ups presupposes — that of agency. Specifically, I argue that whether one will have an
optimism bias toward the dangers of AVs is really a matter of whether one feels
in control of one’s actions when facing those dangers.
Why is it important that the our possible inability to form optimism
bias toward the dangers of AVs depends on agency? AVs are distinct from other
dangerous technology products in a fundamental way. Namely, AVs prevent their
users from feeling like they have control over those dangers, as opposed to
many other dangerous consumer products that allow consumers to at least feel as
though they can control the possibility of being harmed.
Let me consider Dr. Phillips’ two examples in greater detail. First we have
the chainsaw. As we have mentioned, when we walk into the hardware store and
buy a chainsaw we probably know how dangerous it is (and if not, we should
probably watch Texas Chainsaw Massacre for more information). But, as
Dr. Phillips suggests there is uncertainty about whether you will get
hurt by that chainsaw. This uncertainty likely leads to the optimistic belief
that you won’t get hurt — what we have called the optimism bias — and allows
you to buy the chainsaw despite its dangers.
But it looks like we’ve missed a step in our analysis: why exactly are
we uncertain that a chainsaw will hurt us? This question leaves open why
exactly we develop an optimism bias in this case.
We see an analogous unanswered
question in our example of purchasing an AV. Indeed it will be pre-determined
by an AV’s programming whether or not
it will hurt us under certain conditions. But when deciding to purchase an AV,
it is still uncertain that we will ever encounter those circumstances and
therefore it is also in some sense uncertain whether or not we will get hurt.
So we have uncertainty of harm in both the chainsaw and AV cases but optimism
bias in the former and not in the latter. So, if we are committed to the idea
that AVs resist the formation of optimism bias towards their dangers, it is
unlikely that uncertainty of harm is the only factor determining our lack of
optimism bias in these cases.
I would like to propose that
considering issues of agency can help explain why we seem inclined to form an
optimism bias when it comes to the dangers associated with AVs rather than
chainsaws. I am neither trying to nor am equipped to provide a fully
fleshed-out, general theory of agency. Rather, I only intend to make claims
about the extent to which people feel in control of their actions in certain
situations.
Why does the uncertainty that a chainsaw will hurt us inspire an
optimism bias? Part of what may lead us to
form the optimistic belief that we won't get hurt by the chainsaw,
despite its potential dangers, is that we feel confident in our ability
to handle a chainsaw. This idea that degrees of confidence in one’s ability to
mitigate uncertain danger seems to explain why certain people purchase
dangerous equipment and others don’t. Many people do not feel comfortable in
their ability to handle a chainsaw, which may help explain why a lot of people
don’t form optimism biases about the dangers of chainsaws and therefore don’t
purchase them. On the other hand, professional loggers probably don’t think
twice about purchasing chainsaws because they are so confident in their ability
to use them, despite the fact that even loggers are injured by chainsaws.
But what about AVs? Talking about
degrees of confidence in one’s
ability to mitigate the dangers of AVs at first glance seems silly. There is
nothing we can do to prevent an AV from killing us in cases in which it is
programmed to do so: we cannot mitigate the dangers associated with AVs.
But that precisely is the interesting point. This feeling of helplessness
before we even set foot in an AV could explain why we would be unlikely to
develop an optimism bias towards the dangers of AVs.
What is this feeling of helplessness
really a feeling of? This feeling seems rooted in a question of agency — of how much control we have over our actions.
This also could explain the development of an optimism bias when it comes to
the dangers of chainsaws: the degree of confidence we have in our ability to
mitigate the dangers of a chainsaw is an expression of how much control we feel
we have over our actions.
Where, though, does this feeling of
helplessness — the feeling of a lack
of agency — come from? Of course, considerations of human psychology have
something to do with it. And if we are to take seriously the lack of optimism
bias formation as a problem for AVs as an emerging technology, study of these
considerations of human psychology will be helpful. But this I leave to the
cognitive scientists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and decision theorists.
The point that I want to offer to the broader discussion about autonomous
vehicles and add on to Dr. Phillips’ suggestion is that there is something
about AV technology itself that may cause individuals to feel this helplessness
and be unable to develop optimism biases against the dangers of AVs in contrast
to the way they can develop optimism bias towards the dangers of other
technologies. And this ‘something’ seems to be that, unlike other dangerous
technologies, AV technology takes the metaphorical and literal wheel out of our
hands when it comes to dangerous situations. It is an AV’s source code rather
than our shaky — but nonetheless our — hands that may steer us to our
deaths. It is this aspect of AV technology, I believe, that makes us feel
helpless at its prospect.
- Joe Rabinovitsj 4/24/16
* By some accounts,
that collision involved a human driver crashing into an AV. The manufacturer
claimed this incident revealed nothing wrong with the AV system. I heard this
kind of upside-down logic once before, when karate master Mas Oyama knocked out
a bull by punching it in the head. Oyama’s detractors said, “Nah, the bull was
drugged.” As if just anybody could punch out even a drugged bull.
**My lecture slides on
other aspects of AV technology assessment are downloadable from Slideshare, http://www.slideshare.net/fredphillips/the-selfdriving-car?qid=0c2ac803-13a0-4ae1-9dcb-5cb56e6d9a0b&v=&b=&from_search=1
Reference
J.-F. Bonnefon, A.
Shariff and I. Rahwan (2015) Autonomous Vehicles Need Experimental Ethics: Are
We Ready for Utilitarian Cars? http://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.03346v1.pdf